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Abstract—Understanding correlation judgement is important to designing effective visualizations of bivariate data. Prior work on
correlation perception has not considered how factors including prior beliefs and uncertainty representation impact such judgements.
The present work focuses on the impact of uncertainty communication when judging bivariate visualizations. Specifically, we model how
users update their beliefs about variable relationships after seeing a scatterplot with and without uncertainty representation. To model
and evaluate the belief updating, we present three studies. Study 1 focuses on a proposed ”Line + Cone” visual elicitation method
for capturing users’ beliefs in an accurate and intuitive fashion. The findings reveal that our proposed method of belief solicitation
reduces complexity and accurately captures the users’ uncertainty about a range of bivariate relationships. Study 2 leverages the “Line
+ Cone” elicitation method to measure belief updating on the relationship between different sets of variables when seeing correlation
visualization with and without uncertainty representation. We compare changes in users beliefs to the predictions of Bayesian cognitive
models which provide normative benchmarks for how users should update their prior beliefs about a relationship in light of observed
data. The findings from Study 2 revealed that one of the visualization conditions with uncertainty communication led to users being
slightly more confident about their judgement compared to visualization without uncertainty information. Study 3 builds on findings
from Study 2 and explores differences in belief update when the bivariate visualization is congruent or incongruent with users’ prior
belief. Our results highlight the effects of incorporating uncertainty representation, and the potential of measuring belief updating on
correlation judgement with Bayesian cognitive models.
Index Terms—Information visualization, Bayesian modeling, uncertainty visualizations, correlations, belief elicitation
1 INTRODUCTION
Correlation judgement is an important topic and has been recently stud-
ied by the data visualization community [15,26,47,57]. Understanding
how people perceive correlations from data is necessary for the design
of effective visualizations like scatterplots. Visualization researchers
have investigated perceptual constraints on correlation judgment, in-
cluding the use of Weber’s Law [15, 47], a log-linear model augmented
with censored regression and Bayesian methods [26], and other visual
features [57]. While these empirical studies and models provide valu-
able insights and recommendations for correlation visualization design,
they can be expanded to consider other factors that affect people’s
understanding of variable relationships.
One such factor is a user’s prior beliefs when interpreting a corre-
lation visualization. Previous studies often examine the perception of
correlations between unnamed variables to avoid the effects of prior
knowledge [46, 47] so that participants’ beliefs about the variables do
not influence their judgements. However, in practice, people rely on
prior knowledge when interpreting and learning from correlation visu-
alizations. As a result, it is important to investigate how prior beliefs
affect the perception and interpretation of correlations. In addition
to prior beliefs, another factor related to correlation judgement that
warrants more research is uncertainty communication. Recently, vi-
sualization researchers have argued for the importance of uncertainty
communication in information visualization [18]. Uncertainty commu-
nication techniques like hypothetical outcome plots (HOPs) [21, 25]
provide methods to visualize uncertain data for general audiences.
The experiments in this paper build on previous research on correla-
tion judgement by examining the impact of prior beliefs and uncertainty
communication. We explore the following research questions: (1) how
do prior beliefs impact one’s correlation judgement? (2) how do people
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adjust their beliefs when the correlation visualization aligns or conflicts
with their prior belief? (3) when uncertainty communication is incor-
porated in a correlation visualization, are users more or less likely to
adjust their beliefs based on the conveyed relationship?
We also use Bayesian cognitive modeling [32] to quantitatively
model how people interpret newly observed data in light of existing
prior knowledge. Bayesian cognitive modeling offers a principled
framework to understand how people interpret visualizations in light
of prior beliefs [28] and how such beliefs should be updated with
new information from a data visualization through Bayesian reasoning
[29, 40, 44]. This provides a normative framework for evaluating the
effects of visualization on beliefs, including the impact of uncertainty
communication on users’ interpretations of data [10, 20, 28] and the
presence of biases that impair data-driven decision making [29].
Building such Bayesian cognitive models requires an accurate un-
derstanding of people’s prior beliefs. Existing techniques for eliciting
priors about correlations have a number of limitations, including a re-
liance on expert statistical knowledge related to correlation coefficients
and their relationship to data [31, 43, 58]. Our paper first evaluates a
novel graphical elicitation method, “Line + Cone”, for eliciting beliefs
about the correlation between two variables through interactive data
visualizations. With the proposed elicitation method, we conducted
two experiments to study how people update beliefs about bivariate
relationships when seeing correlation visualization with and without
uncertainty representation.
This paper bridges several areas of past work on correlation judg-
ment, belief elicitation, and uncertainty visualization, while also draw-
ing on recent methods for modeling belief change using the framework
of Bayesian inference. Specifically, this paper’s contributions are:
• Study 1: Introduce and validate the graphical “Line + Cone”
method for eliciting prior beliefs about bivariate correlations,
which is then used in the subsequent studies to measure belief
change.
• Study 2: Compare differences in belief updating across correlation
visualization with and without uncertainty communication.
• Study 3: Explore differences in users’ belief update when the
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correlation visualization (with and without uncertainty communi-
cation) is congruent or incongruent with their prior beliefs.
Analysis of Study 1 showed that the “Line + Cone” belief elicitation
method can be used to estimate peoples’ mental representations of the
correlation compared to a recent, more labor-intensive approach from
cognitive science for measuring subjective belief distributions [52].
Study 2 revealed that participants updated their beliefs more effec-
tively, and felt more confident, after observing visualizations with
representations of uncertainty. In Study 3 we found evidence to sup-
port the hypothesis that people exhibit less belief change when seeing
correlation visualizations that are incongruent with their prior beliefs.
These results lay the groundwork for quantitative theories of how vi-
sualizations guide, and in some cases distort, how people learn about
correlations through data visualization.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Correlation perception and the effects of prior beliefs
A common task in visual analytics is assessing the relationship between
two or more variables, often as a scatterplot [54]. In statistics, such
relationships are typically quantified as correlations. However, statistics
like Pearson correlation can be misleading. For example, Anscombe’s
quartet [1] demonstrates that hidden patterns in the data are obscured by
identical statistics. Even for expert data analysts, visual data inspection
is an important part of the analysis process. Past psychology studies
have considered how perceptual processing of scatterplots can affect
an individual’s understanding of correlations [39, 46, 47]. Building off
that research, InfoVis researchers have identified scatterplots as an ef-
fective technique in discriminating correlations [34], testing correlation
perception with Weber’s law through additional techniques [15, 26],
and identifying visual features in correlation perception [57]. However,
these studies have not considered how prior beliefs affect individual’s
perception of variable relationships.
Research in psychology shows that prior beliefs have a strong influ-
ence on people’s interpretation of uncertain data [4,9,30,50], especially
for correlations [2, 3]. A central theory that explains why prior beliefs
are important is the dual-process account of reasoning [7, 24]. This
theory posits that fast heuristic processes (System 1) competes with
slower analytic processes (System 2) that can affect logical decisions.
Evans et al. [8] suggested that belief bias [7, 9] could occur as “within-
participant conflict” between the two systems when participants tend
to agree with an argument based on whether or not they agree with
the conclusion rather than its logical conclusion. Alternatively, other
research focused on theory-motivated reasoning bias based on “con-
gruent” and “incongruent” evidence relative to an individuals’ belief
systems [30]. These theories motivate design aspects in Study 2 and 3.
2.2 Uncertainty visualizations
Uncertainty visualizations are important as they enable better decision-
making by conveying the possibility that a point estimate may vary
[20]. More recently, research in InfoVis has provided innovative tech-
niques like Hypothetical Outcome Plots (HOPs) [21, 25], frequency
based representations [10, 27], visual semiotics [38], and design guide-
lines [13] for visualizing uncertainty. Alternatively, other visualization
researchers have studied important application aspects of uncertainty
visualizations including hurricane prediction through ensemble mod-
eling [36, 49], comparing users’ prior beliefs congruence to social
data [28], how uncertainty evaluation is prone to error [17], and its
potential to improve ones ability to make predictions about replications
of future experiments [19].
2.2.1 Eliciting correlation beliefs
Psychologists have used a variety of approaches to elicit beliefs about
correlations. Initial research used two-step procedure to elicit partic-
ipant’s correlation belief [3, 22]: (1) determine relationship direction
(positive or negative) and (2) rate the strength of the relationship. Later
methods expanded on this approach by including Likert Scales, Spear-
manss correlation, probability of concordance, and conditional quantile
estimates [6,11, 23,31, 43]. However, there are several shortcomings
with the previous approaches. Some methods only elicit beliefs about
central tendency without capturing degree of uncertainty, while meth-
ods which do elicit uncertainty are labor-intensive [58]. Most methods
rely on some background knowledge of statistics [31, 43], including
how to interpret correlation coefficients, thus limiting their applicability
to non-expert populations.
Cognitive scientists have developed a related technique for eliciting
subjective belief distributions named Markov Chain Monte Carlo with
People (MCMC-P; [52, 53]). Inspired by algorithms for MCMC esti-
mation [11], MCMC-P as an approach to estimate a person’s subjective
belief distribution through sampling. In Study 1, we use MCMC-P as
an elicitation benchmark to our proposed Line + Cone belief elicitation
technique and outline this technique in Section 4.
2.3 Bayesian cognitive modeling in data visualizations
Cognitive modeling in visualization initially was studied as a subset of
visuospatial reasoning in how individuals derive meaning from external
visual representations [55]. Visualization researchers have integrated
similar ideas to understand visualization cognitive processes through
insight-based approaches [12] and top-down modeling [37, 45]. More
recently, InfoVis researchers have used Bayesian models to understand
cognitive processing of visualizations [29,56]. Cognitive scientists have
demonstrated the importance of Bayesian modeling to understanding
individual decision-making [14, 32]. In this approach, an individual
has some prior belief that is updated when the individual consumes
additional data, resulting in their posterior beliefs. Bayesian cognition
models have been used to understand deviations from optimal belief
updating due to conservatism, sample-based inference (approximation)
and “resource-rational” interpretations of cognitive bias [35].
To our knowledge only two previous InfoVis studies [29, 56] have
combined belief elicitation with a Bayesian cognitive modeling frame-
work. Wu et al. [56] examined whether people integrated prior probabil-
ities with data in an optimal manner. They found that priors influenced
predictions in a manner consistent with Bayesian inference, although
to a lesser extent than predicted by the model. However, a limitation
to this study was that participants were given a prior; therefore, prior
beliefs cannot be examined. In contrast, Kim et al. [29] empirically
measured participants’ prior beliefs about the a target proportional quan-
tity and used those priors to calculate the normative posterior given the
data that was presented. In aggregate, participants’ judgments were
consistent with predictions derived from Bayesian inference, although
less so for large data sets. However, participants expressed greater
uncertainty in their judgments than expected from the Bayesian model.
Further, the authors connect such Bayesian modeling and belief elicita-
tion with recent research on visualizing uncertainty through techniques
like HOPs [21, 25]. Our work extends their framework but considering
correlation beliefs rather than proportional values.
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS METHODS
Our primary research question is the effect of providing uncertainty
communications on users’ belief updating in correlation visualization.
In order to address this research question, we conducted a sequence of
three experiments with latter ones building on the earlier studies.
A key to understanding users’ belief update is the ability to accu-
rately and intuitively capture such beliefs. Study 1 evaluates the Line +
Cone elicitation method relative to Markov Chain Monte Carlo with
People (MCMC-P) [52], a belief elicitation method from cognitive
science. After validating the Line + Cone method, we apply it in the
next two experiments to address the main research question. In Study
2, we explore the effect of correlation visualizations with and without
uncertainty representation on belief updating. Our primary hypothesis
is that visualizations with uncertainty representation will overall lead
to less belief updating about the correlation between two variables.
Findings from Study 2 provides partial evidence to support the primary
hypothesis. To expand on the findings, we are interested in further
understanding users’ belief update when the data visualization was de-
liberately manipulated based on users’ prior beliefs. Therefore, Study
3 extends Study 2’s design but introduces a treatment that alters the data
provided to participants to be either congruent or incongruent with their
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C. Example results
Fig. 1. Elicitation methods in Study 1. A: For the Line + Cone elicitation,
participants first recorded the belief about the most likely relationship
between two variables (red line), then adjusted the set of plausible al-
ternatives based on their uncertainty (gray lines). B: For the MCMC-P
elicitation, participants responded to a series of two-alternative forced
choices in which they judged which of two lines was more likely to repre-
sent the true relationship between the variables. C: Example comparison
of elicitation results for a participant in Study 1. Dark blue lines indicate
the chain of chosen alternatives from MCMC-P across 100 trials. Light
blue lines indicate unchosen alternatives. The corresponding mean and
CI from the Line + Cone elicitation is shown at the right of each plot.
prior beliefs. We then evaluate the degree to which individuals update
their beliefs when data provided either conflicts or aligns with their
prior and whether the presence of uncertainty visualizations interact
with that effect.
To analyze the results of Study 2 and 3, we employ mixed effects
models to identify differences between treatments. The mixed ef-
fects models control for individual heterogeneity assumed between
participants and the datasets (variable pairs) provided to participants.
To explain the findings from the mixed effects models, we evaluate
whether Bayesian cognitive models can be used to predict users’ poste-
rior beliefs under different experiment treatment.
4 STUDY 1: EVALUATING LINE + CONE ELICITATION
Our goal in Study 1 (see preregistration1) was to develop and validate
the Line + Cone visual interface for eliciting prior beliefs about the
correlation between two variables. In selecting our approach, we aimed
to measure beliefs about both the most likely correlation between vari-
ables and the degree of uncertainty, without a need for statistics domain
knowledge or numerical reasoning (see Section 2.2.1). We assessed
1http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=zp7hr3
the convergent validity of the Line + Cone method by comparing it
to a higher resolution, but more labor-intensive, approach to eliciting
subjective beliefs: Markov Chain Monte Carlo with People (MCMC-
P; [52, 53]). MCMC-P resembles common sampling-based estimation
algorithms such as Metropolis-Hastings in which a chain of states are
sampled from an underlying probability distribution. In MCMC-P, state
transitions are determined by asking participants to make forced-choice
comparisons of the likelihood of possible values of the target parameter
in many trials (usually in the range of 100 or more).
In our experiment we elicited prior beliefs about five sets of variables
using both MCMC-P and the Line + Cone method. We created variable
sets to cover a range of plausible correlationspossible divergent prior be-
liefs. For example, we expected that for the relationship Weight x Price
of diamonds most participants would believe there is a strong positive
correlation, while there may be less consensus about the relationship
Vaccination rate x Rate of illness. Based on participants’ responses we
estimated the mean and confidence interval of their subjective prior
belief (i.e., the relative likelihood of possible correlations between two
variables). We then examined the degree to which the resulting prior
means and CIs were correlated across the two methods.
4.1 Study Design
The experiment involved a within-subjects manipulation of elicitation
method (Line + Cone vs. MCMC-P). Participants’ beliefs were elicited
for the same set of five variable sets (Table 1) using each method in
a blocked presentation. The order of elicitation methods and variable
sets within each block were randomized for each participant.
4.1.1 Line + cone elicitation
We designed a visual interface in which the mean and CI are directly
elicited through the user’s interaction. Each elicitation involves a two-
step procedure (Figure 1A). First, the user selects the orientation of a red
line according to their belief about the most likely relationship between
the variables. Second, the user adjusts the width of the uncertainty cone.
The uncertainty cone was depicted by gray lines which were draws
from a Normal distribution centered on the most likely correlation (red
line) and truncated at -1 and 1. Participants were instructed to adjust the
cone such that the lines captured the range of “plausible alternatives”
for the relationship between the variables.
4.1.2 MCMC-P elicitation
Markov Chain Monte Carlo with People (MCMC-P) is used to estimate
subjective belief distributions based on a series of choices between
two alternatives. In our task, each alternative represents a potential
correlation between a pair of variables. For each variable set there
were 100 choice trials. On each trial, the participant was shown two
lines representing potential correlations (Figure 1B). Participants were
instructed to select the alternative which was more likely to represent
the true relationship. On the first choice trial the alternatives were
two randomly selected correlations, one positive and one negative. In
subsequent trials, the choice set included the alternative chosen on the
previous trial and a proposal generated from a Normal distribution
centered on the previous choice. The width of the proposal distribution
was adaptively tuned based on how often a participant accepted new
proposals (see [48]). Each block resulted in a chain of alternatives that
were chosen by the user (Figure 1C). The prior mean was calculated as
the mean of the sampling chain, while the CI was the range between
the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles.
4.2 Participants
N = 152 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants earned $2.00 upon completion of the task, which took an
average of 25.4 minutes (SD = 12.2). Per our pre-registration, we used
several measures of task engagement to decide whether to exclude a
participant. We excluded 55 participants who failed an attention check
question and 36 participants who made nonsensical or incomplete
responses to a set of open-ended questions regarding how they would
respond to real-world situations. We also excluded 35 participants who
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Fig. 2. Study 2 Design. Each user goes through ten variable sets (five variables for two rounds) and elicit their belief before and after seeing data
visualizations about each variable set. In Round 1, the user views five variable sets through only scatterplots. In Round 2, the user is randomly
assigned to either Line, Cone, or HOP visualization treatments and views the remaining five variable sets.
met pre-specified exclusion criteria based on responses in the MCMC-
P elicitation, including response streaks, response alternation, and
response time. After accounting for all exclusions, N = 92 participants
were included in the analysis.
4.3 Results and Discussion of Study 1
Table 1. Correlations between prior means and CIs elicited through Line
+ Cone and MCMC-P methods in Study 1.
Prior mean Prior CI
Variable set Pearson r p-value Pearson r p-value
Weight x Price of diamonds .26 .012 .34 .001
Exercise amount x Body weight .37 < .001 .29 .005
Yearly income x Height .12 .26 .27 .010
Yearly income x Stress .45 < .001 .30 .003
Vaccination rate x Rate of illness .40 < .001 .39 < .001
Our primary question was whether the belief distributions elicited with
the Line + Cone method correlated with those generated using our
MCMC-P procedure. We calculated Pearson correlations between the
prior means and CIs for each variable set (Table 1). Elicited prior means
were significantly correlated for 4 of the 5 variable sets, with the Yearly
income X Height variable set the only exception. Prior CIs elicited
from the two methods were significantly correlated in all 5 variable sets.
These results suggest that our visual Line + Cone elicitation method is
able to capture variation in beliefs about correlations across different
variable sets, including beliefs about the most likely relationship as
well as the degree of uncertainty, while being less labor-intensive than
MCMC-P and requiring less statistics domain knowledge than existing
elicitation methods.
5 STUDY 2: BELIEF UPDATING WITH AND WITHOUT UNCER-
TAINTY REPRESENTATIONS
In the second study, we applied the Line + Cone elicitation method
to examine belief change in the context of correlation visualization.
We evaluated whether the type of visualization impacted the degree
to which people updated their beliefs. Specifically, our Study 2 Main
Hypothesis 2 was that correlation visualizations which include repre-
sentations of the uncertainty in the true population correlation would
lead to less belief updating when people’s prior beliefs were inconsis-
tent with the presented data. This hypothesis is motivated by research
2http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=39yn5g
on confirmation bias [41, 42] showing that people overweight evidence
that is consistent with their prior beliefs. Uncertainty visualizations,
by giving credence to a range of possible relationships (including less
likely relationships that are more similar to a person’s prior belief) may
lead to less belief updating compared to visualizations that only repre-
sent the most likely a posteriori relationship. As a secondary hypothesis,
we hypothesize that datasets with small and moderate correlations lead
to less belief updating compared to datasets with stronger correlations.
5.1 Study Design
We employed a mixed design with a between-subjects manipulation
of the visualization type (with and without uncertainty representation)
and a within-subjects manipulation of the sample correlation of data
presented to participants. In each trial participants reported their belief
about the relationship between a set of variables, both before and after
they experienced a data visualization All participants completed two
rounds of five trials. In the first round the datasets were visualized as
scatterplots to all participants (Scatter condition). In the second round
the scatterplots were augmented with a visualization of the predicted
population correlation based on the given dataset. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the following conditions (Fig 2):
• Line: A line representing the most likely population correlation
was superimposed on the scatterplot 3
• Cone: The line appeared with an uncertainty cone which repre-
sents the 95% confidence interval for the population correlation
• HOP: Hypothetical outcome plots (HOPs, [21, 25]) were used to
present animated draws from the 95% confidence interval for the
correlation
5.1.1 Datasets
We created two groups of five variable pairs that covered a range
of population correlations between -0.9 to 0.9. We then generated
100 random samples for each variable pair based on the population
correlation. The participants were told that the dataset is a a sample
of data collected from the real world. 4 All points were re-centered
with a mean of zero on each variable. All participants saw the same
3Note that the Line condition does not contain an uncertainty representation
while the Cone and HOP conditions do.
4Due to random sampling, the sample correlations differed slightly from the
specified population correlation.
data points for each variable pair. The order of the variable pairs was
randomized for each participant.
Note that population correlations were specified for each variable
pair based on agreement among the authors (see examples in Figure
3). Our assumptions about the correlations of these variables may not
reflect the ground truth relationship, and may differ from participants’
beliefs. However, because we measure each individual’s prior beliefs,
we can assess whether belief updating was affected by any mismatch
between their prior and the sample correlation.
5.1.2 Elicitation, attention check procedures, and collected data
Each trial consisted of a prior elicitation, correlation visualization, and
posterior elicitation. For both elicitation steps we used the Line + Cone
method validated in Study 1 (Figure 1A). Each elicitation resulted in
three measurements: the most likely correlation (µ) and the lower and
upper bounds of the uncertainty cone (blower,bupper). All three values
were bounded between ρ =−1 and ρ =+1.
We designed practice questions to familiarize participants with the
Line + Cone elicitation. Participants answered test questions to ensure
that they understood how to interpret the elicitation interface, including
the direction of a correlation and the degree of uncertainty captured
with the cone. We also included attention check questions (same as in
Study 1) to screen inattentive respondents or other invalid data [5].
In Study 2 and 3, we also collected basic demographic data, duration
of each trial, and the error count of users in the instructions section.
5.2 Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. For all
studies we required that participants were located in the U.S. and had a
95% or above approval rating. Participants earned $1.80 upon comple-
tion of the task, which took an average of 25.7 minutes (SD = 14.6) to
complete. Per our pre-registration, we excluded any participants due
to: failed attention check questions (n = 35); technical errors (n = 15);
or task completion in less than 5 minutes (n = 38). This left n = 212
participants for the analysis (Line: 74; Cone: 64; HOP: 74).
5.3 Results
For the analysis we built three mixed effects models using R’s lme4
package for two linear regressions and R’s glmmTMB for a beta regres-
sion. We used the normal approximation to calculate p-values of fixed
effects using t-values produced by lme4.5
Dependent & Independent Variables: We considered three depen-
dent variables (DV): (1) the absolute belief difference, (2) the differ-
ence in uncertainty, and (3) belief distance from the model’s predicted
posterior mean. For our independent variables (IV), we included the
Visualization treatment (Line, Cone, HOP, and Scatter) and the absolute
correlation of the generated data for the variable sets (see Figure 3)
Model Specification: For each model, we included the visualiza-
tion treatment and the absolute correlation of the data as fixed effects.
For the visualization treatment, the Scatter condition is the omitted
reference condition. We treated the sample correlation as a categorical
variable and used zero absolute correlation as the omitted reference
condition. We included the unique variable set and the participant id as
random effects.
5.3.1 Beliefs about variable pairs
We first examined participants’ beliefs before and after experiencing
the data visualization. Figure 3 displays pre- and post-treatment judg-
ments about the most likely correlation (µ , top row) and uncertainty
(CI, bottom row) for five of the ten variable pairs, aggregated across
visualization treatments. With respect to the mean correlation µ , prior
judgments (green density plots) were largely consistent with the rela-
tionship that was designated for each variable pair, such that the modal
prior belief was close to the sample correlation. This suggests that the
datasets presented were congruent with most participants’ prior belief
about the relationship between the variables. One notable exception
was Income tax rate X Poverty rate, where the designated correlation
5The code used is included in our supplemental materials.
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Fig. 3. Density plots of means (top row) and CIs (bottom row) of elicited
belief distributions for selected variable sets in Study 2. Dashed lines
indicate the sample correlation of the dataset presented to participants.
was ρ = 0 but prior beliefs were relatively uniformly distributed from -1
to +1. Post-treatment beliefs about the same variable sets (blue density
plots) strongly shifted toward the sample correlation of the observed
dataset (dashed lines) for all variable sets. The plots for the CIs reveal
that the strength of the sample correlation also affected changes in
uncertainty. CIs decreased after seeing strongly correlated datasets
(ρ =±0.9) but in some cases increased following data visualizations
with weaker relationships. We report more detailed analysis of how the
uncertainty changed in different treatments in section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Change in beliefs about most likely relationship
We used linear mixed effects regression to model the effect of visual-
ization conditions and population correlation on the absolute change in
beliefs about the most likely correlation (|µpost −µpre|. There were no
significant effects (Figure 4, left), though the Cone condition showed
marginally smaller changes in beliefs compared to the Scatter condition
(β =−0.07 [−0.14,0.01], z=−1.779, p= 0.075). Thus, while par-
ticipants clearly shifted their beliefs about the most likely correlation
in response to observed datasets (Figure Figure 3), contrary to our
expectations we did not find that the degree of belief change differed
by visualization treatment or population correlation.
5.3.3 Change in uncertainty
Mixed effects linear regression was used to model the effects of vi-
sualization condition and population correlation on the change in un-
certainty (|CIpost −CIpre|). As shown in Figure 4 right, relative to the
Scatter condition, the Cone condition exhibited greater reduction in un-
certainty (β =−0.10 [−0.16,−0.03], z =−2.782, p < .01). In other
l
l
l
l
l
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Fig. 4. Study 2 fixed effects coefficients for absolute belief difference (left)
and uncertainty difference (right). Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Asterisks indicate statistical significance than zero using p-
values: *** 99.9%, ** 99%, * 95%. For visTreatment, the reference
category is the Scatter condition.
words, participants assigned to the cone Condition felt less uncertain
(more confident) with their input. There was no difference in the Line
(β =−0.02 [−0.08,0.05], z =−0.468, p = 0.640) or HOP condition
(β = 0.02 [−0.05,0.08], z = 0.473, p = 0.636). In addition, more
extreme sample correlations had a greater impact on belief change:
Compared to ρ = 0.0, there was a greater reduction in uncertainty for
ρ = .4 ((β =−0.14 [−0.27,−0.01], z=−2.138, p < .05) and ρ = .9
(β =−0.29 [−0.42,−0.17], z =−4.513, p < .001) variable sets.
5.3.4 Accuracy of posterior beliefs
We examined the accuracy of participants’ posterior mean (µpost )
compared to the sample correlation of the observed datasets. In the
Scatter condition, posterior means were biased to be more extreme
for moderately positive and negative sample correlations. Relative
to the ρ = 0 variable sets, absolute error was higher for ρ = ±0.4
variable sets (β = .29 [.19, .41],z = 5.46, p < .001) but did not dif-
fer from ρ = ±0.9 variable sets (β = .002 [−.11, .11],z = .03, p =
.96) The remaining visualization conditions led to more accurate
beliefs across the full range of sample correlations. Compared to
the Scatter condition, the absolute error was lower in all three vi-
sualization conditions (Line: β = −.22 [−.34,−.10],z = −3.50, p <
.001; Cone: β = −.34 [−.47,−.21],z = −4.96, p < .001; HOP: β =
−.25 [−.38,−.13],z =−3.97, p < .001).
5.4 Bayesian belief updating model
Prior
Predicted
Posterior
(Bayesian-Informed)
Predicted
Posterior
(Bayesian-Uniform)
-1 1ᵨ r
In this section we use Bayesian
cognitive modeling to investi-
gate the influence of prior be-
liefs on the belief updating pro-
cess. Under the principles
of Bayesian inference, people
should integrate new evidence
about a correlation with their
prior beliefs about that relation-
ship. Bayesian models provide a normative benchmark for how beliefs
should change depending on the strength of the evidence and partici-
pants’ uncertainty. For instance, a person who is confident that variables
are negatively correlated may only shift their beliefs a small amount af-
ter seeing a dataset with a positive sample correlation. A second person
who is highly uncertain about the relationship, however, may be more
strongly influenced by the same data and report posterior beliefs that are
closely matched to the sample correlation. This framework also allows
us to identify when people systematically fail to adjust their beliefs as
predicted by the Bayesian model. Returning to the main hypothesis
of Study 2, if uncertainty representations cause smaller adjustments to
beliefs, this will correspond to larger divergence between participants’
elicited posterior beliefs and the predictions of the Bayesian model
compared to other conditions.
Having elicited prior beliefs about each set of variables, we exam-
ined whether participants’ posterior beliefs (following the data visu-
alization) could be predicted by a normative Bayesian model. The
model uses Bayesian inference to predict a posterior belief distribu-
tions over possible population correlations, ρ , based on an observed
dataset and a particular prior (see [33] for similar model formula-
tion). We evaluated two variants of the model that differed only in
their prior. The Bayesian-Informed model relied on the participant’s
elicited prior to calculate the normative posterior distribution after ob-
serving a dataset. The prior belief was modeled as a bounded Normal
distribution, ρ ∼ BoundedNormal(µpre,σpre, [−1,1]), where µpre and
σpre are the mean and standard deviation of the participant’s elicited
prior. The observed bivariate data X was modeled as having been gen-
erated from a standardized multivariate Normal distribution with mean
of zero and standard deviation of 1 on each dimension (see [33]),
X ∼MultivariateNormal([0 0] ,[1 ρρ 1
]−1
). (1)
Under the Bayesian-Uniform model, the prior was a uniform distribu-
tion over the correlation coefficient, ρ ∼Uni f orm(−1,1). The mean
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Fig. 5. A: MAE and KLD between elicited posterior and predictions of
Prior-only, Bayesian-Informed, and Bayesian-Uniform models. B: Model
performance as a function of the absolute distance between the elicited
prior mean and the sample correlation.
and 95% CI of the posterior distribution for this model is equivalent to
the values used for the visualizations in the Line, Cone, and HOP treat-
ments. Predicted posterior distributions for ρ were estimated for both
models using MCMC with the PyMC3 library [51] with two chains of
20,000 samples and 1000 burn-in iterations. Lastly, we compared the
elicited posteriors to the elicited priors, absent any belief updating. We
refer to this baseline as the Prior-only model in the results below.
The relative fit of the models reflects the weight of prior beliefs in
the updating process, with the Bayesian-Informed model representing
the normative integration of priors with new evidence. If people relied
only on the visualization without accounting for prior beliefs, their
elicited posteriors should be best fit by the Bayesian-Uniform model.
In contrast, if they did not adjust beliefs upon observing a dataset, the
Prior-only model should provide the closest match to posterior beliefs.
5.4.1 Model comparison
Following [29] we evaluated each model’s performance with two met-
rics: mean absolute error (MAE) between the predicted and elicited pos-
terior means; and Kullback-Liebler distance (KLD) (Figure 5A). These
measures are complementary in that MAE captures the magnitude of
differences in beliefs independently of the amount of uncertainty, while
KLD measures correspondence across the entire belief distributions.
We used mixed effects linear regression to compare MAE and KLD
with model and visualization type as fixed effects and random effects
for participants and variable sets.
In terms of MAE there were significant effects of visualization
treatment (χ2(1,3) = 33.17, p < .001) and model (χ2(1,2) = 333.97,
p < .001), but no interaction (χ2(1,6) = 7.55, p = .27). Pairwise
comparisons indicated that MAE was lower under both the Bayesian-
Informed and Bayesian-Uniform models than the Prior-only model in
all four visualization treatments (all p < .001). The Bayesian-Uniform
model achieved lower MAE than the Bayesian-Informed model in the
Scatter (z = −4.52, p < .001), Cone (z = −2.8, p = .01), and HOP
(z =−2.48, p = .04) conditions, but the two did not differ in the Line
condition (z =−2.22, p = .07). Comparing the best-fitting Bayesian-
Uniform model across visualization treatments showed that MAE was
higher in the Scatter group than the Cone (z = 3.14, p = .01) and Line
groups (z= 2.94, p= .02), but not significantly different from the HOP
group (z = 2.54, p = .05).
For KLD there were significant effects of visualization treatment
(χ2(1,3) = 67.57, p < .001), model (χ2(1,2) = 31.64, p < .001), and
model × treatment interaction (χ2(1,6) = 32.49, p < .001). In the
Scatter condition, KLD of the Prior-only model was lower than the
Bayesian-Informed model (z = −3.32, p = .003), but did not differ
from the Bayesian-Uniform conditions (z =−.87, p = .66). This indi-
cates that the Bayesian model was relatively unsuccessful at predicting
the posterior distribution in the Scatter condition, failing to outperform
the baseline Prior-only model. In the remaining conditions (Line, Cone,
HOP), the Bayesian-Uniform model had lower KLD than both the
Prior-only and Bayesian-Informed models (all p < .022). As was the
case for MAE, the KLD of the Bayesian-Uniform model was higher in
the Scatter condition than the other conditions (all p < .001), but did
not differ among the Line, Cone, and HOP groups. This supports the
earlier finding that the accuracy of posterior beliefs was poorer in the
Scatter condition compared to the other treatments.
The predictions of the three models diverge most when there is a dis-
crepancy between participants’ priors and the sample correlation of the
observed dataset. We therefore explored how the fit of each model de-
pended on the absolute distance between the prior mean and the sample
correlation (Figure 5B). At small distances the three models have com-
parable MAE and KLD, while the advantage for the Bayesian-Uniform
model grows with increasing distance between the prior and sample
correlation. The poorer fit of the Bayesian-Informed model indicates
that participants discounted their priors when they observed a dataset
with a drastically different correlation. Notably, at small distances KLD
was lowest for the Prior-only model. This result suggests that when
people observed a dataset that was consistent with their prior, they were
less likely to update their beliefs as predicted by either Bayesian model.
5.5 Discussion of Study 2
Results of the regression analysis and cognitive modeling showed that
visualizations with representations of the population correlation (Line,
Cone, and HOPs) led to greater accuracy in posterior beliefs compared
to the Scatter condition. In addition, higher correlations led to larger
reductions in uncertainty, potentially because stronger relationships
are easier to detect in scatterplots [46, 47] and are associated with less
uncertainty in the population correlation. We found initial evidence for
this updating process using the Bayesian cognitive model, showing that
when the sample correlation presented to participants was far from their
prior mean, they strongly adjusted their beliefs to reflect the pattern in
the data (Figure 5B).
We did not find support for our main hypothesis that uncertainty
visualizations would be associated with smaller changes in beliefs.
On the contrary, the Cone visualization (with a cone of “plausible
alternatives” representing uncertainty in the correlation based on the
data) led to greater reductions in uncertainty. This result suggests
that the explicit representation of uncertainty provided by the Cone
visualization leads to greater confidence about the true relationship
compared to the other visualization types. Interestingly, we did not find
a similar effect on uncertainty change in the HOP condition, possibly
due to the transient nature of the animated uncertainty cone.
There were two shortcomings of the present study that may have
limited our ability to detect differences in belief updating between con-
ditions. First, participant’s prior beliefs largely aligned with the sample
correlation, leading to many cases with little room for participants
to adjust their beliefs. Second, the relatively large sample size of the
datasets (n= 100) meant there was relatively little uncertainty about the
population correlation. This may explain why the Bayesian-Uniform
model provided the best fit to elicited posteriors, such that the sample
correlation had a stronger influence than individuals’ priors. Study 3
was designed to further explore how these factors affect belief change.
Congruent
Participants are randomly assigned to one out of three visualization groups:
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16 variable pairs, predetermined 
through a pilot study, are as-
signed to produce datasets with 
these characteristics:
- Congruent/Incongruent 
- High / Low Uncertainty
Each variable pair is assigned to two treatments that aect the data shown based on user’s prior elicitation.
Congruent / incongruent variables result in data aligned/opposite user's prior and low/high uncertainty variables
use either 10 or 100 samples.
Line graph Line + Cone graph HOPs graph
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Fig. 6. Study 3 design. Like Study 2, users elicit their beliefs about
correlations of variable pairs before and after seeing data visualizations.
Users are randomly assigned to Line, Cone, and HOP visualization
treatments. The datasets are generated based on users’ prior elicitation
as either congruent/incongruent and 10 or 100 data points.
We manipulated the data provided to be either congruent or incongruent
with the user’s elicited prior belief. In addition, we manipulated the
amount of data uncertainty by varying the sample size.
6 STUDY 3: HOW CORRELATION CONGRUENCE AND UNCER-
TAINTY AFFECT BELIEF UPDATING
The hypothesis of Study 2 was that people would exhibit less belief
change when they experienced visualizations with representations of
uncertainty. The main hypothesis for Study 36 extends this further to
predict that viewers of uncertainty representations would exhibit smaller
changes in beliefs when correlation visualizations are incongruent with
users’ prior belief and when the dataset has a smaller sample size.
6.1 Study Design
For Study 3, we extended the design of Study 2 by explicitly manipu-
lating the congruence of the sample correlation (factor 1) with a user’s
prior belief and the amount of uncertainty (factor 2). Both above fac-
tors are within-subjects while the visualization treatment remains a
between-subject factor. Figure 6 summarizes the design of Study 3. For
each variable pair, participants saw datasets that were either congruent
or incongruent to their prior beliefs:
• Congruent datasets: Random samples were drawn from a multi-
variate normal distribution with correlation 0.25 away from the
prior mean. For example, if a participant’s prior mean was 0.85,
the data was sampled from a distribution with population corre-
lation of 0.6 (0.85− 0.25). In this condition a user always saw
sample correlations with the same sign as their prior belief.
• Incongruent datasets: Random samples from a multivariate nor-
mal distribution with correlation value that is 1.0 away from the
prior mean. For example, if the prior mean was 0.6, the data
was sampled from a distribution with a population correlation of
-0.4. In this condition, participants saw datasets with the opposite
correlation sign from their prior belief.
We also manipulated the number of samples in the datasets for spe-
cific variable pairs (10 points vs. 100 points). Datasets with 10 points
result in greater uncertainty as measured by the 95% confidence inter-
val. As in Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to visualization
6http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=x7ph2u
conditions of Line, Line + Cone and HOPs. Given Study 2’s results
that users achieved better accuracy with all three visualization types,
we omitted the Scatter condition.
6.1.1 Datasets, elicitation, and attention check procedures
For Study 3 we selected variable pairs from the results of a pilot study.
With 50 pilot participants, we elicited prior belief and uncertainty about
30 variable pair candidates, then categorized variables into a 2 X 2
grid of high/low social consensus on correlation and uncertainty. 7
With lessons learned on users’ beliefs about the variable pairs from
Study 2 (section 5.3.1), we aimed to select pairs that cover a range
of distributions of beliefs about the mean correlation and uncertainty.
We selected four variables with either high / low correlation consensus
and high / low uncertainty. Study 3 used the same elicitation process,
instructions, and attention checks as Study 2.
6.2 Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Partici-
pants earned $1.80 upon completion of the task, which took an average
of 22.9 minutes (SD = 12.28) to complete. Per our pre-registration,
we excluded any participants who: failed attention check questions
(n = 12); technical errors (n = 95); or completed the entire task in less
than 5 minutes (n = 11). This left n = 267 participants for the analysis
(Line: 89; Cone: 92; HOP: 86).
6.3 Results
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Dependent & Independent Variables: Simi-
lar to Study 2, we considered three dependent
variables: (1) the absolute belief difference, (2)
the difference in uncertainty, and (3) the user’s
belief distance from the model’s predicted pos-
terior. For our independent variables (IV), we
created two features based on our variable condi-
tions from Figure 6. First, we defined pre-belief
distance as the distance between users’ prior
elicitation and the correlation of the provided
sample, which is larger when a participant is
provided incongruent datasets. Next, we defined
sample uncertainty as the size of uncertainty
shown to users resulting from the sample size.
In doing so, we used continuous IVs ranging
from zero to two rather than binary variables.
For reference, we provide kernel density plots (left) for the two IV’s
partitioned by its respective condition categories.
Model Specification: We employed three mixed effects models
as in Study 2 (see Section 5.3). For each model, we included the
interaction terms between the visualization treatment, the pre-belief dis-
tance, and the sample uncertainty as fixed effects. For the visualization
treatment, the Line condition is the omitted reference condition.
6.3.1 Change in belief about most likely relationship
For absolute belief difference (Figure 7, left), we found the largest
effect to be pre-belief distance (β = 0.73[0.64,0.81],z = 2.40, p <
.001), indicating that users updated their beliefs more when they viewed
incongruent datasets.
There were significant interactions between pre-belief dis-
tance and visualization type, such that there were smaller belief
changes when the data was incongruent in both the Cone (β =
−0.12 [−0.19,−0.05], z = −3.3, p < .001) and HOPs (β =
−0.11 [−0.18,−0.04], z = −3.16, p < .01) conditions relative to
the Line condition. This finding is in line with our hypothesis that in
the incongruent condition, users would show smaller update in their
belief when uncertainty representations are present.
Finally, while the HOP condition led to slightly larger changes com-
pared to the Line condition (β = 0.10 [0.02,0.17], z = 2.400, p <
7Social consensus was measured as the standard deviation of prior means,
while average uncertainty was measured as the mean CI.
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Fig. 7. Study 3 fixed effects coefficients from analyzing absolute belief
difference (left) and uncertainty difference (right). The error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals. Asterisks indicate statistical significance than
zero using p-values: *** 99.9%, ** 99%, * 95%. For visTreatment, the
reference category is the Line condition.
0.05), this condition had a negative interaction with sample uncer-
tainty such that beliefs shifted less after seeing smaller datasets
(β = −0.07 [−0.13,−0.01], z = 2.181, p < .05). We did not find
corresponding effects for the Cone condition. This difference between
the Cone and HOP visualizations might suggest that uncertainty is more
evident in larger uncertainty amounts when using the HOP technique.
This is potentially due to the lack of a fixed representation of most likely
correlation in the HOP technique as opposed to the Cone technique.
6.3.2 Uncertainty change
In our regression of the uncertainty difference (Figure 7, right), we
found that users in the Cone condition exhibited more reduction in un-
certainty than the Line condition (β = −0.19 [−0.27,−0.10], z =
−4.166, p < .001), replicating the effect seen in Study 2.
There was not a significant effect in the HOPs condition (β =
−0.07 [−0.16,0.02], z =−1.514, p = 0.130).
Pre-belief distance had no effect on the uncertainty difference in
any condition. However, sample uncertainty had a positive effect on
changes in uncertainty (β = 0.13 [0.02,0.23], z = 2.391, p < .05).
We also found that the Cone visualization condition had larger ef-
fects on the uncertainty difference when interacting with sample un-
certainty (β = 0.20 [0.12,0.28], z = 4.784, p < .001). The HOPs
condition also showed a positive interaction with uncertainty differ-
ence when interacting with datasets with larger sample uncertainty
(β = 0.13 [0.05,0.21], z = 3.019, p < .01). These findings suggest
that participants in the Cone condition showed more overall reduction
in posterior uncertainty compared to the Line treatment but the HOP
condition did not show similar effects. Interestingly, when dealing
with larger uncertainty (10 data points), the presence of an uncertainty
representation resulted in an increase in users’ uncertainty. This finding
suggests that both visualization techniques convey uncertainty when
uncertainty amounts are larger, but users’ experience of the HOP condi-
tion is similar to the Line condition when dealing with datasets with
smaller uncertainty. Perhaps this is due to users’ inability to perceive
small angular movements of the line.
6.3.3 Accuracy of posterior beliefs
We used beta regression to model the effects on the distance of users’
posterior beliefs from the true sample correlation. We found that pre-
belief distance had the largest positive effect on users’ post-belief
distance (β = .34 [0.16,0.52] z = 17.254, p < .01). In other words,
posterior beliefs were less similar to the sample correlation when the
dataset was incongruent with users’ prior beliefs. We also found that
compared to the Line condition, the HOP condition had a positive effect
on posterior distance when viewing a dataset with more uncertainty
(β = 0.29 [0.14,0.45], z = 2.181, p < .01). This might be due to
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Fig. 8. MAE and KLD by model for Study 3.
the lack of a fixed most-likely correlation representation in the HOPs
condition, therefore when sample uncertainty is larger, users are more
prone to larger distances (errors) in their judgements.
6.4 Bayesian belief updating model
We used the models from Study 2 to examine how prior beliefs influ-
enced belief updating in Study 3. In general, the best fit to elicited pos-
teriors in terms of both MAE and KLD was achieved by the Bayesian-
Uniform model in all conditions (Figure 8). Incongruent trials provide
a strong comparison of the Bayesian-Informed and Bayesian-Uniform
models because they involve datasets that conflict with participants’
prior beliefs. If people integrate new evidence with their elicited prior,
they should show smaller shifts in beliefs in Incongruent trials than
expected under the Bayesian-Uniform model. However, as was seen in
Study 2, posterior distributions were best-fit by the Bayesian-Uniform
model, suggesting a stronger influence of the data visualization on
posterior beliefs. Notably, the only condition in which the two models
performed comparably on Incongruent trials was the Cone treatment,
where there were no differences in MAE (t(722.63) = 1.33, p = 0.18)
or KLD (t(731.98) = 1.78, p = 0.08), indicating that Cone visual-
izations produced belief updates that more closely aligned with the
normative prediction of the Bayesian-Informed model.
6.5 Discussion of Study 3
We predicted that people exposed to uncertainty visualizations (Cone
and HOP conditions) would exhibit less belief change compared to
those without uncertainty (Scatter and Line conditions). We found
strong support for this hypothesis in Study 3 when participants saw
data that was incongruent with their prior beliefs. Both the Cone and
HOP treatments were associated with smaller belief updates compared
to the Line condition which did not represent uncertainty about the
correlation. Uncertainty visualizations also affected whether there
were shifts in participants’ degree of uncertainty. Relative to the Line
condition, Cone visualizations led to greater reductions in uncertainty
for large datasets, whereas uncertainty did not change when datasets
were small. Similar (albeit weaker) effects were present for HOP
visualizations.
Finally, we replicated the modeling results from Study 2, showing
that posterior beliefs were best-fit by the predictions of the Bayesian-
Uniform model. Although this does not imply that participants com-
pletely disregarded their prior beliefs, it indicates that the data visual-
izations tended to have a stronger influence on posterior beliefs than
expected from a normative Bayesian perspective. The Cone visualiza-
tion was the only condition in which the Bayesian-Informed model
performed comparably to the Bayesian-Uniform model. This result
suggests an alternative interpretation of the smaller degree of belief
updating in that condition when faced with incongruent data. Rather
than representing an irrational failure to modify beliefs akin to confir-
mation bias, the Cone condition may be most effective for striking the
appropriate balance between new data and prior beliefs.
7 DISCUSSION, FUTURE WORK, AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the effect of prior belief and uncertainty rep-
resentations on correlation judgement. In Study 1 we developed the
Line + Cone method for eliciting people’s beliefs about the correlation
between two variables, including their degree of uncertainty. The Line
+ Cone method serves as a good choice for eliciting users’ beliefs about
bivariate relationships for future studies of correlation judgement. In
addition to capturing users’ beliefs about the correlation means (com-
monly done in previous correlation judgement studies), results from
all three studies demonstrate that it is also important to capture users’
uncertainties about their judgements. In Studies 2 and 3, we used the
Line + Cone method to investigate belief updating in the context of data
visualization. We found that visualization conditions with uncertainty
communication led to less belief updating compared to visualizations
without uncertainty, especially when the presented correlation visualiza-
tion is incongruent with users’ prior beliefs. An important conclusion
is that judgements are affected by the existence of uncertainty depic-
tions. How we encode uncertainty (e.g., Cone vs. HOPs), also affects
users’ belief and uncertainty change. As the visualization community
pays more attention to the importance of uncertainty representations
and elicitation, it is important to be cognizant to the affects of such
techniques on users’ judgements.
In our studies we applied a Bayesian cognition framework to un-
derstand how people update their beliefs about bivariate correlations
with different types of visualizations. Recent studies have applied
insights from Bayesian cognitive modeling to understand how peo-
ple integrate new data with their existing knowledge [32, 35]. The
Bayesian framework provides normative benchmarks that can be used
to evaluate whether people optimally revise their beliefs given their
existing uncertainty and the strength of new evidence conveyed through
a visualization [29]. We used Bayesian models to compare partici-
pants’ posteriors to three benchmarks: no change in beliefs (Prior-only
model); the normative posterior when taking into account the elicited
prior (Bayesian-Informed model); and the normative posterior when
disregarding the prior (Bayesian-Uniform model). In both Studies 2 and
3, elicited posterior distributions were best-described by the Bayesian-
Uniform model, suggesting that the characteristics of the visualized
dataset had a stronger influence on posterior beliefs than expected under
the Bayesian-Informed model.
There are several possible explanations for why posterior beliefs
appeared to underweight participants’ priors. One possibility is that
people have a different interpretation of the cone representation which
is used to elicit their uncertainty. In order to minimize demands on nu-
merical or probabilistic reasoning, participants were simply instructed
to adjust the cone to capture the range of “plausible alternatives” for
the correlation between the variables. In Study 1 we found support for
the claim that this method captures participants’ uncertainty, but there
may nevertheless be a mismatch between the elicited distribution and
participants’ subjective beliefs such that people are more uncertain than
indicated by their elicited priors.
We found other evidence that people updated beliefs in a way consis-
tent with Bayesian inference. In Study 2, users reduced their uncertainty
to a greater extent for more extreme sample correlations. In Study 3, un-
certainty increased when people saw small datasets (n = 10) compared
to large datasets (n = 100), even in the Line condition which lacked an
explicit representation of the correlation uncertainty. Participants also
expressed greater uncertainty in the posterior beliefs than predicted by
the Bayesian models, echoing the findings of Kim et al. [29].
These studies provide the groundwork for investigating how peo-
ple interpret data that is relevant to strongly-held or favored beliefs.
Prior beliefs can distort the perception of new evidence, as is seen in
widespread evidence of confirmation bias [16, 41, 42]. Using intuitive,
visual belief elicitation methods in conjunction with Bayesian cognitive
models offer a promising path toward understanding the causes of such
biases in data visualization.
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